Litigating with Victim Impact Testimony: The Serendipity That Has Come from Payne v. Tennessee by Burr, Richard
Cornell Law Review
Volume 88
Issue 2 January 2003 Article 9
Litigating with Victim Impact Testimony: The
Serendipity That Has Come from Payne v.
Tennessee
Richard Burr
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard Burr, Litigating with Victim Impact Testimony: The Serendipity That Has Come from Payne v. Tennessee, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 517
(2003)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol88/iss2/9
LITIGATING WITH VICTIM IMPACT TESTIMONY:
THE SERENDIPITY THAT HAS COME FROM
PAYNE V. TENNESSEE
Richard Burrt
INTRODUCTION
Victim impact testimony is lethal for capital defendants and often
illusory for the witnesses who provide it. Although such testimony in-
variably serves the prosecution's goal of procuring a death sentence,
the opportunity to testify does not address most of the needs of the
survivors of murder' that could be met by the criminal justice process.
At best, victim impact testimony provides a momentary opportunity
for survivors to give voice to their loss, be heard, and feel less isolated.
At worst, victim impact testimony exploits the immense pain suffered
by survivors-using the emotional reaction to their circumstances as a
lever to produce a death sentence, while leaving them as onlookers in
a criminal justice process whose focus is punishing the offender, not
meeting the needs of survivors.
In the wake of Payne v. Tennessee,2 it is virtually impossible for de-
fense counsel to exclude or limit victim impact testimony. If it is ad-
mitted, its emotional power will frequently produce a death sentence.
Its introduction over defense objection, no matter how emotionally
charged it may be and likely to result in a death sentence "based
on ... caprice or emotion" rather than reason, 3 will almost never pro-
vide the basis for a successful argument on appeal.
These realities have pushed capital defense lawyers in new direc-
tions. We have come to realize that we must overcome our instinct
that survivors are unreachable and inherently joined to the prosecu-
tion. Instead, we must reach out to survivors with genuine compas-
sion. We must learn from survivors which of their needs can be met
within the criminal justice process and do what we can, consistent with
representing the interests of our clients, to ensure that those needs
t Richard Burr is a partner in Burr & Welch, a private firm in Houston, Texas, de-
voted to the representation of persons facing the death penalty. He formerly directed the
death penalty project of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and presently serves as a member
of the Federal Death Penalty Resource Counsel project.
I I use the term "survivors" or "survivors of murder" to refer to the family members
and loved ones of murder victims.
2 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
3 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).
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are met. We must champion not only compassion for our clients, but
also a greater compassion for survivors. In short, we must work for the
respectful inclusion of survivors in the criminal justice process and not
be complicit in their exploitation and virtual exclusion.
I
LITIGATING TO EXCLUDE OR CONSTRAIN VICTIM
IMPACT TESTIMONY
Due to the magnitude of the harm inflicted by the bombing of
the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City,4 the trial of Timothy
McVeigh presented questions about victim impact testimony that no
court had ever before addressed. Moreover, the trial judge in the
case, Chief Judge Richard P. Matsch of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Colorado, tried mightily to be even-handed and to assure
due process for McVeigh. 5 As such, it is a useful case to illustrate the
adversarial process's virtual inability to filter out inflammatory emo-
tion from victim impact testimony.
Before the penalty phase of the trial began, McVeigh filed several
motions in limine to exclude all victim impact evidence, asserting that
Payne was decided erroneously, and that the admission of victim im-
pact testimony in his case would inevitably lead to a violation of the
Eighth Amendment and his right to a fair trial.6 In the alternative, he
requested that the court limit the admission of victim impact evidence
and employ certain procedural safeguards to minimize the risk that
the sentencing decision in his case would be the product of emotion
rather than reason.7
McVeigh's arguments to constrain victim impact testimony were
based on the view that the Supreme Court in Payne did not intend to
abandon the longstanding Eighth Amendment principle that "'any
decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on
reason rather than caprice or emotion.""' He found support in Payne
because even though the Court held that "the Eighth Amendment
4 The April 19, 1995 bombing killed 168 people and severely injured hundreds
more. Jo Thomas, McVeigh Guilty on All Counts in the Oklahoma City BombingJury to Weigh
Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1997, at Al.
5 This is not to say thatJudge Matsch or any judge does otherwise in different cases.
However, because Judge Matsch, counsel for McVeigh, and the government collectively
viewed the magnitude of the offense as a test of the criminal justice system's ability to
provide due process, all parties paid more attention to this constitutional requirement
than they might have in an ordinary case.
6 See Motion for New Trial, United States v. McVeigh, 958 F. Supp. 512 (D. Colo.
1997) (No. 96-CR-68), available at 1997 WL 403417, at *83 (addressing McVeigh's motions
in limine).
7 Id.
8 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 849 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977)).
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erects no per se bar"9 to the admission of victim impact testimony, it
also noted that "[iln the event that evidence is introduced that is so
unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mecha-
nism for relief."10 In his concurrence, Justice Souter reiterated this
safeguard: "[T]here is a traditional guard against the inflammatory
risk [of victim impact testimony], in the trial judge's authority and
responsibility to control the proceedings consistently with due pro-
cess, on which ground defendants may object and, if necessary, ap-
peal." 1 On this basis, McVeigh argued that the Payne Court sought to
strike a balance between the introduction of victim impact evidence
and the defendant's Eighth Amendment rights, requiring trial courts
to restrict the presentation of victim impact evidence appropriately so
that the emotion inherently associated with such evidence did not
overwhelm the jury's responsibility to make a reliable, individualized
sentencing determination based on a full and fair consideration of the
mitigating and other aggravating circumstances.
Because the Payne Court gave no guidance on how to strike this
balance, and because there was at that time no federal court prece-
dent concerning victim impact evidence in federal capital trials, Mc-
Veigh urged Judge Matsch to draw upon the state courts' experience
under the Payne decision.' 2 Pointing to the cautionary principles and
procedures developed in State v. Muhammad, 3 Cargle v. State,1 4 and
State v. Bernard,'5 McVeigh urged Judge Matsch to take steps to mini-
mize the risk that the emotion inherent in victim impact testimony
would overwhelm the jury's ability to reach a sentencing decision
based on reason. 16
Judge Matsch adopted the cautionary principles articulated in
those cases. Outlining what he considered to be the parameters of
admissible victim impact testimony in an in-chambers conference on
May 30, 1997,17 Judge Matsch explained that victim impact evidence
must conform with the following:
[It must] be as objective as possible and it has got to be the conse-
quences of the crime. And I don't believe that it can have as much
9 Id. at 827.
1o Id. at 825 (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179-83 (1986)).
11 Id. at 836 (Souter, J., concurring).
12 See Motion for New Trial, United States v. McVeigh, 958 F. Supp. 512 (D. Colo.
1997) (No. 96-CR-68), available at 1997 WL 403417, at *91 (addressing McVeigh's motions
in limine).
'3 678 A.2d 164, 175-81 (N.J. 1996).
14 909 P.2d 806, 830 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
15 608 So. 2d 966, 972-73 (La. 1992).
16 See Motion for New Trial, McVeigh, 958 F. Supp. 512, available at 1997 WrL 403417, at
*91.
17 See id.
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emotional impact as some of the things that are being discussed
here.
[I] t can include the loss of a-people to an agency and can include
the loss of a family member, what has happened, the empty chair,
but not the emotional aspect of that, the grieving process, the
mourning process. I don't think that's part of it. That's where I'm
talking about objective, as opposed to subjective. The facts, rather
than the emotional impact.18
Later, in the course of ruling on defense objections to specific aspects
of victim impact evidence, the court acknowledged the inherent diffi-
culties of defining the parameters of admissibility for such evidence,
as well as the need to guard against the dangers of an emotion-driven
sentencing determination:
Payne vs. Tennessee involved .. . cautions given by every justice who
wrote; and almost everyjustice wrote in that case. And there simply
is no clear guidance as to where the line between appropriate, par-
ticularly victim-impact testimony ends and an appeal to passion, the
human reactions, emotive reactions of revenge, rage, empathy-all
of those things-begins.
So I know that these rulings are not going to be consistent with the
views of many; but nonetheless, we have to guard this hearing to
ensure that the ultimate result and the jury's decision be one made
as truly a moral response to appropriate information, rather than an
emotional response. '9
Attempting to follow these principles, Judge Matsch granted some of
McVeigh's requests to exclude certain kinds of information, but de-
nied others. However, Judge Matsch flatly refused to employ the pro-
cedural safeguards requested.2 °
Thereafter, the government presented penalty phase victim im-
pact testimony by twenty-seven family members of persons who were
killed, three persons who were themselves injured, six persons in-
volved in rescue and medical assistance efforts, and three others-a
worker from the day care center in the Murrah Building, an epidemi-
ologist, and a member of the state medical examiner's office.
What is manifest from reading the trial record is that the district
court's efforts to restrict and control the presentation of emotionally
overwhelming evidence failed. Nearly every victim impact witness
18 Id.
19 Id., available at 1997 WL 403417, at *91-92.
20 See id., available at 1997 WL 403417, at *83. McVeigh urged the court to adopt
procedures similar to those utilized at that time by Louisiana, NewJersey, and Oklahoma,
in which a pretrial hearing was held to listen to and determine the admissibility of every
victim impact witness's testimony. See State v. Bernard, 608 So. 2d 966, 972-73; State v.
Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 180-81 (N.J. 1996); Cargle v. State, 909 P.2d 806, 828-29
(Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
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strayed beyond the limits established by the district court. Not only
was "the empty chair"21 acknowledged, but also the effects of the
empty chair, in riveting, emotional, poignant, heart-wrenching detail,
were allowed to flood the courtroom. The "grieving process, the
mourning process," which the court expressly prohibited-and the
compelling emotional need for witnesses to pay homage to their loved
ones and to find some way of sharing their intense pain-rolled over
everyone.
II
VICTIM IMPACT TESTIMONY IN UNITED STATES V. MCVEIGH
Various witnesses provided accounts of their reactions, or those
of other family members, to the realization that their loved one had
been killed in the bombing. One witness described being at the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) command center when her son came to
this realization:
They had set up an area in the bar of the hotel, and we went in
there and they had the TVs on. And Patrick started screaming. He
was really upset, and he was upsetting the other people, because he
said: "I don't want my dad to be dead. I don't want my dad to be
dead." And so he was seeing all the pictures on TV.
So they took us up to a room so the other people wouldn't be so
upset. And we got in there and he was crying. And he said, "Mom,
let's say a prayer," so I said okay. He got down and he said, "God, I
don't want my father to be dead; but if he is, that's okay because I
know he's with you. But take care of my mom and me and my sis-
ter." And then he kind of calmed down after that, but we couldn't
watch TV. 22
Children as victims and as suffering survivors represented a major
portion of the government's victim impact evidence. As such, young
children or adolescents figured prominently in the testimony of six-
teen of the twenty-seven family members who testified. The father of
a child who was not quite eight years old at the time his mother died
in the bombing recounted an incident that occurred while he and his
son were receiving counseling. The father had asked the counselor to
talk with his son, Clint, because Clint had been avoiding him:
And she took him into a room and they talked. And she came back
and she said: "Clint has never seen you cry. He's never seen you
scared. He thinks the people that have done this are after you and
him." And it never dawned on me-you know, I mean that they
weren't after me or him directly; and this very professional lady gets
21 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
22 Trial Transcript, United States v. McVeigh, 958 F. Supp. 512 (D. Colo. 1997) (No.
96-CR-68), available at 1997 WL 296395.
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a tear in her eye and says that-told me that you and your [wife]
have started him a savings account. He's got $180 in there and that
he wants to pay me that money if I'll help you. 23
Another witness, a police officer who was involved in the rescue effort,
recounted that a little girl from the Murrah Building day care center,
who was not there on April 19, approached him and his dog, hugged
the dog, and said, "Mr. Police Dog, will you find my friends?"
24
Some of the most emotionally wrenching testimony was provided
when witnesses were asked about the impact of the deaths of family
members on their children, grandchildren, nieces, and nephews. The
overwhelming emotional quality of this testimony speaks for itself, as
illustrated by the few examples provided below. One mother re-
counted her twenty-year-old son coming to her at three o'clock one
morning:
[H]e was crying very hard. And he said: "I want my dad back. I
want him to see me graduate from college. I want him to meet my
wife and be at my wedding. I want him to see my first child."
He's getting married next month, and there will be a rose where his
father should be. 25
Another witness, who lost her husband, noted an especially poignant
detail concerning her grandson: "He would ask Bev [his mother]
when they were traveling, like to the day care and so forth-he would
ask Bev to run a red light so they could crash and die and he could go
be with papa."26 For the three teenage children of another mother
who testified, the trauma of their father's death had eaten away at
every aspect of their lives. Regarding the oldest, she stated:
[She] graduated from high school last year, and her dad wasn't
there. She was also elected to the.., homecoming court. And your
dad is supposed to walk you out on the football field at homecom-
ing, and I just remember her walking out on the field teary. All
these other girls were all smiling and happy, and she was teary.
27
Regarding her middle child, the mother stated:
[She] has had the hardest time. She was like her daddy's little girl.
She-she told me that she has learned to hate, which is a horrible
thing to hear coming from your 16-year-old baby.... She wrote a
paper for school. The topic was a day that changed her life .... [A]t
the end of the paper, she said that "I never knew such a dark, horri-
ble place existed until I had to go there; and I'm clawing my way out
as best I can." 28
23 Id., available at 1997 WL 298226.
24 Id.
25 Id., available at 1997 WL 292341.
26 Id., available at 1997 WL 292798.
27 Id.
28 Id.
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As to her youngest child, she testified:
[He] went through puberty that summer, which is so hard-to kids
anyway. He started to get a little beard. And I said, "Honey, you've
got to shave, that you're looking messy." And I just remember...
he slammed the wall with his fist and he said, "Who is going to teach
me how to shave it?" 2 9
The father of Clint, the young boy mentioned above, 30 recalled that
for Clint's eighth birthday he had a big birthday party, and:
[A]fter everybody left, Clint climbed up on my lap and started cry-
ing. And he asked me-he said, "Do you think my mom loved me?"
And I said, "Well, your mom loves you more than anything in the
world." And he said, "Why isn't she here?" And I told him-I said,
"Hey, if your mom had the choice, she would be here. She wouldn't
miss this for the world. 31
At the conclusion of his testimony, the Court permitted Clint's father
to read a statement from his son:
"I miss my mom. We used to go for walks. She would read to me.
We would go to Wal-Mart. Sometimes at school maybe a kid will
bring something up"-and he was talking about show and tell-
"something new that he got and someone would ask him or her
where they got it. And they usually say, 'My mom got it,' and that
makes me sad.
"After the bomb, everyone went to my aunt's house, and my
grandma took me to the zoo, my cousin and I to the zoo. While we
were at the zoo, I bought my mom a ring. I bought it for whenever
they found her.
"Sometimes at school around the holidays, I will still make my mom
Mother Days and valentines like the other kids." 32
Equally as moving was the testimony about the impact of the
deaths on the witnesses themselves. Nearly every witness identified a
photograph of their loved one, which often included other family
members, and which often was taken on a special or lighthearted oc-
casion. Identifying this photograph often brought tears and deep-
seated emotion as the witness described the impact of the death of a
child, a spouse, a parent, a brother, or a sister. One witness, fighting
through tears and a choking voice, testified:
I feel like I died, too, on April 19. I feel like my heart looks like that
building. It has a huge hole and that can never be mended....
There is nothing in my life that is the same. I no longer do the
same work. The only thing that is the same is the house that I live
29 Id.
30 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
31 Trial Transcript, McVeigh, 958 F. Supp. 512, available at 1997 WL 298226.
32 Id.
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in, and now it's a house that's not a home, so it really isn't the
same.... My father wants his daughter back. He wants me to be
the way I was before. 33
A mother who lost her fourteen-month-old daughter spoke of feelings
universal to all parents, when she testified:
I think that my fears of her dying when she was first born being
confirmed was the very worst thing for me. When we drove home
that night, the highway overlooked the Murrah Building; and by
that time, it was very dark and it was raining and it was cold. And I
truly, truly believed that my daughter was alive. You know, you
don't ever think-you don't ever think that your own child is dead.
And at this point, I thought that maybe she was in fact still in the
building. And I think my biggest fear at that point was that she set
there in this building and she'd been there for 12 hours, she was in
a dirty diaper, she didn't have a bottle, she didn't have me to hold
her, and she was afraid. And I could picture her just saying
"Momma," and I felt so guilty leaving this place.
And I think in the end, by the time they finally told us that they
found her body, it had been seven days, and I was just so incredibly
thankful that they found her at all; and I felt lucky that I got to hold
her wrapped in a beautiful receiving blanket made by my friend,
Joyce. And that's the last thing that I held.3 4
A husband who lost his wife, who had been a military recruiter, testi-
fied that he took several personal items "[e]verywhere I go":
I have my wife's coffee cup that the children bought for her that
says "No. 1 Mommy." Inside of that is our marriage license, two
rings, and a death certificate. Sitting across the top of the table-or
across the TV is the cap that they were able to salvage that was her
headgear while in uniform.3 5
Another witness gave extremely moving testimony concerning the
many ways in which she and her husband had been affected by the
loss of their adult daughter. This included the pain they felt upon
learning that their daughter's former husband was dating someone
else; how her husband, who did not like house dogs, loved and kept
their daughter's dog in the house; her discomfort at continuing to
exercise at the facility where her daughter used to teach an exercise
class; her determination to accelerate the process of giving to her sur-
viving children the land that, before the bombing, she had intended
to leave for them at her death; her funny and touching dreams of her
daughter; and her need to retire because of not "roll[ing] with the
3 3 Id., available at 1997 WL 292341.
34 Id., available at 1997 WL 295646.
35 Id., available at 1997 WL 296395.
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changes" any more. 36 At the close of her testimony, she summed up
what so many parents feel in these circumstances:
It's so hard for me because Karen was my youngest child. She was
only 32. She had not had a chance to have her babies or have her
life, and I-I'm 61 years old. And I'm her mother, and Ijust should
have gone before she did. And I-it's hard for me, because I've had
everything and she didn't have a chance....
[I]t's hard for me to think about a future anymore. And I think
about my future and my family's future, and I-it's just like-it's
like a-like a star with one of the points gone. And it's going to
always be that way. 3
7
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, McVeigh argued that these and many similar instances of vic-
tim impact testimony interjected a constitutionally intolerable level of
emotion into his sentencing proceeding and created the risk that his
sentence was the product of emotion, not reason. 3s The Tenth Cir-
cuit agreed that the evidence was "poignant and emotional," 39 but
never substantively confronted the argument made by McVeigh that
the evidence was so highly emotional that it overwhelmed the jury's
reasoning capacity. The closest the court came to addressing the issue
meaningfully was the following:
[A]t the conclusion of those rulings [on McVeigh's motions in
limine], the district court stated that it would allow "objective" evi-
dence describing the "fact" of "the loss of... people to an agency
and.., the loss of a family member.., the empty chair, but not the
emotional aspect of that, the grieving process, the mourning pro-
cess." The government followed this instruction, and we have
found few instances where the type of non-objective emotional testi-
mony described by the district court was admitted.40
This conclusion makes one wonder whether the court was reading the
same record from which the preceding examples were taken. That
record contained myriad instances in which witnesses described in
highly emotional terms events that could have been described in far
less or even unemotional terms.
One reason the Tenth Circuit failed to confront this issue was
that it held that trial counsel failed to object properly to many of the
instances of testimony that appellate counsel later alleged to be inap-
propriately emotional.41 Trial counsel for McVeigh, fearing aliena-
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Brief of Appellant at 206-23, United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir.
1998) (No. 97-1287).
39 United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1221 (10th Cir. 1998).
40 Id. at 1221-22.
41 Id. at 1217-18.
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tion of the jury if they objected to each witness, had approached the
bench early in the prosecution's penalty-phase case and had asked to
be allowed a continuing objection. However, that objection was to
testimony that went "'beyond the impact on the lives of the wit-
nesses, ,42 but was not addressed to the emotionality of the testimony.
The Tenth Circuit purported to review the unobjected-to testimony
for plain error, but because it saw no improper emotionality in the
testimony, it necessarily found no plain error.
The lesson of McVeigh is that, despite the best intentions of the
trial judge to filter out the emotionality of victim impact testimony,
emotionality takes over a courtroom and cannot be controlled during
such testimony. Perhaps defense counsel could have done a better
job of objecting, but nearly every witness violated the court's well-ar-
ticulated principle, and defense counsel could not, without the risk of
significantly alienating the jury, have objected to all of the objectiona-
ble testimony. The truth is that the emotion was so powerful that it
overwhelmed all those involved in this case-jurors, counsel, and
judge. Concrete boundaries and limits to testimony should have been
set in a pretrial evidentiary hearing in which all the witnesses testified
and their testimony was either excluded or constrained by judicial di-
rection. Such a hearing would have allowed defense counsel to object
without the fear of disaffecting the jury. However, the trial court re-
fused to conduct such a hearing. As a result, emotionality thereafter
took over the courtroom, and the Tenth Circuit blessed the whole
process. Although some of the Tenth Circuit's tolerance for the emo-
tionality of the testimony can be understood as its resistance to giving
McVeigh a new trial or sentencing proceeding-what we as his coun-
sel characterized as the "McVeigh exception" to the law-some toler-
ance undoubtedly was attributable to the dynamic of victim impact
testimony. Whatever testimony is admitted will be seen as in compli-
ance with Payne, no matter how emotional.
III
REACHING OUT TO VICTIMS AND EMBRACING THEIR NEEDS
The effort to constrain the outpouring of emotion in victim im-
pact testimony can distort defense counsel's view of the individuals
providing the testimony. Rather than seeing them as completely inno-
cent and profoundly hurt, defense counsel are inclined to see them in
an adversarial light-as impassioned and embittered adjuncts to the
prosecution team. In reality, the only way prosecutors can assist survi-
vors within the context of the criminal justice process is to provide
42 Id. at 1218 (referring to trial court's framing of the basis for defense counsel's
continuing objection).
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them with a forum for the expression of their suffering. However,
whereas prosecutors cannot begin to meet other, often more compel-
ling needs of survivors, defense counsel often can.
During criminal prosecutions, for example, survivors often have a
need for information: Why was my loved one murdered? What did my
loved one experience in the course of being killed? What did he or
she say and do before death came? What is going to happen in the
prosecution? How long will it take? What are the steps that must be
taken before the prosecution is over? What is going on in the prose-
cution at any particular moment?
Survivors also have a need for someone-the right person-to be
held accountable for their loved one's death. It is usually of no satis-
faction to them if there is doubt about whether the right person is
being prosecuted for the murder. Rather, the individual being held
accountable for the crime must be the person who actually committed
the crime.
Furthermore, survivors also have a need to get through the prose-
cution with as little re-traumatization as possible. Every court pro-
ceeding creates the risk that survivors will relive the experience of
learning of their loved one's murder and re-experience, empatheti-
cally, the murder itself. This problem is often at its worst during the
trial, where the details of the murder are revealed publicly. If a death
sentence is imposed, every post-conviction proceeding and develop-
ment poses the risk of further traumatization. Indeed, because post-
conviction proceedings usually span a number of years, the cycle of
continuing re-traumatization may also extend for many years.
The defendant and the defense team are often in the best posi-
tion to respond to these needs. As Tammy Krause, who for the past
five years has been pioneering defense-team-based outreach to survi-
vors, states, "The organic relationship is between the defense and the
victim, not between the prosecution and the victim. The prosecutors
are, at best, very interested observers, who can do little to meet the
survivor's needs within the criminal justice system without the interest
and cooperation of the defense. 43
To assist defense teams in capital cases in reaching out to survi-
vors, Krause and Dr. Howard Zehr have developed a process of de-
fense-based survivor outreach founded on the principles of restorative
justice.44 This process asks the following questions: (1) Who was hurt?
(2) What are their specific needs? and (3) Who is obligated to meet
43 Richard Burr & Tammy Krause, Address at the Bryan R. Shechmeister Death Pen-
alty College, Santa Clara University School of Law (Aug. 14, 2002) (on file with author).
44 For a general discussion of and introduction to restorative justice, see HOWARD
ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES 177-214 (1990).
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their needs?45 Rather than simply trying, convicting, and punishing
the defendant, this framework expands the focus of the criminal pros-
ecution to address the judicial needs of survivors, to allow for coopera-
tion between the defense and the prosecution that may benefit
survivors, and to include expressions of offender accountability.46
The defense-based outreach to survivors that comes from this
framework asks two basic questions of survivors: (1) What is most im-
portant to you? and (2) What are your needs within the judicial pro-
cess? From these modest inquiries can arise a range of potential
benefits for survivors. For example, survivors may:
* gain formal introduction to defense team members, thereby over-
coming the first and in many ways most formidable barrier pro-
duced by the adversarial process;
* receive timely information about upcoming hearings and dates;
* learn about the judicial process and the possible roles survivors
can play;
* get answers to at least some of their questions about the case and
the crime;
" gain opportunities to talk with others about the victim in a variety
of settings;
* identify and articulate their judicial needs;
" decide which track-trial or guilty plea-best serves their
interests;
* meet with defense attorneys and, in appropriate situations, the
offender;
* encourage plea agreements that take their interests and needs
into account.
The possibilities that present themselves as a result of defense-
based survivor outreach can benefit both capital offenders and survi-
vors. For example, in a recent plea agreement in a highly publicized
federal death penalty case, United States v. Stayner, the family of the
murder victim wanted to avoid trial, believing that it would be too
traumatic. 47 In addition, the family wanted to avoid the inevitable
years of appeal and post-conviction review that would follow if the of-
fender were sentenced to death. The defendant, Cary Stayner, was
45 Burr & Krause, supra note 43.
46 See id.
47 See Kevin Fagan, Plea Bargain in Slaying of Yosemite Naturalist, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 13,
2000, at A3. Stayner was charged with two separate killings near California's Yosemite Na-
tional Park. Id. He pleaded guilty to the 1999 murder of a Yosemite nature guide, and
thus avoided the death penalty. Id. In August of 2002, however, ajury found Stayner guilty
of the 1999 murder of three tourists outside the park, and in October the jury recom-
mended a death sentence. See Stacy Finz & Alan Gathright, Jury Recommends Death for Three
Yosemite Murders, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 10, 2002, at Al, 2002 WL 4032489. Stayner was sen-
tenced to death on December 12, 2002. Stacy Finz, The Case of a Lifetime, S.F. CHRON., Dec.
15, 2002, at Al, 2002 WL 4038188.
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willing to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of life without the
possibility of release. 48 The survivors also had other needs, including
a desire that Stayner stop making public statements or giving inter-
views about the case, that Stayner be cut off from the possibility of any
personal financial gain from selling the film or literary rights to the
story of his case, and that, should they choose, they would have the
opportunity to meet Stayner with a third-party facilitator present.49
The plea agreement incorporated all these elements.
CONCLUSION
The ultimate value of defense-based survivor outreach was ele-
gantly reflected in a Los Angeles Times article that appeared on Decem-
ber 1, 2000, the day after Stayner was sentenced: 50
In a gripping courtroom apology, a weeping Cary Stayner
turned to face the family, friends and fiance of Joie Armstrong on
Thursday to seek their forgiveness for killing the Yosemite
naturalist.
"I wish I could take it back, but I can't. I wish I could tell you
why I did such a thing, but I don't even know myself," Stayner said,
locking eyes with his victim's mother, Lesli Armstrong, who held his
gaze through her own tears until he was done.
"I'm so sorry," he went on, haltingly. "I wish there was a reason.
But there isn't. It's senseless." 5 1
The victim's mother, Lesli Armstrong, stated:
"He's devastated. I'm devastated. We're all devastated. I ached for
him, I ached for me. I ached for everything. I wish we could all
take it back and make it all different."
She said she accepts Stayner's apology and will save room in
her heart to forgive him some day for taking away Joie .... 52
When Payne was decided, no one could have foreseen that it
could lead to such a result. Death can so easily be Payne's fruit, but
there is also the possibility that life, freed of anger, hatred and ven-
geance, can be its harvest. This is the serendipity of Payne.
48 Plea Agreement at 13-14, United States v. Stayner, No. 99-5217 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13,
2000).
49 Id. at 5-8.
50 Christine Hanley, At His Sentencing, Yosemite Killer Apologizes to Family, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 2001, at A3.
51 Id.
52 Id.
